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Quantum Information, Processing and Communication (QIPC) is a field con-
cerned with technological implementations established on quantum mechan-
ical phenomena. It is established on the concept that the action of manipu-
lating information is controlled by the quantum physical effects. Therefore,
quantum information can be characterised, quantified and processed as a
physical body applying laws of quantum mechanics. QIPC consists of two
major disciplines, quantum computing and quantum communication.
Communication is bound by the transfer of information. Quantum commu-
nication applies some of the fundamental features of quantum mechanics,
such as, the superposition principle and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
to protect the transfer of information. One of the most advanced quan-
tum information related technology at present is Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD). It is defined as a process of encoding information into a quantum




Therefore, the security of the transfer of information is no longer provided
by the computational complexity of a mathematical function rather by laws
of quantum mechanics. The implementation of QKD requires an appropriate
protocol utilising two channels namely a quantum channel and an authenti-
cated classical channel. The quantum channel is utilised for the distribution
of single photons from which a raw key can be obtained. The classical channel
is used to obtain a final secret key through a process named post-processing.
An experimental set up is constructed using a single photon source and free
space as a quantum channel. A shared key is obtained from the quantum
transmission. The main focus of this work is the post-processing procedure
where the error correction protocol named Cascade is applied to locate and
fix the errors detected in the shared raw key.
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Quantum Information, Processing and Communication (QIPC) is a field of
study based on how information can be computed and exchanged by apply-
ing laws of Quantum Mechanics to provide the security to the information
exchange. Ideas which late gave light to QIPC, were first introduced by
Claude E. Shannon as Information Theory in his two papers entitled “A
Mathematical Theory of Communication ”and “Communication Theory of
Secrecy Systems”published in 1948 and 1949 [1, 2]. In these two papers,
Shannon defined Information Theory as a science of encoding information
in all sorts of symbols and transmitting it through noisy channels [1, 2]. In
other words, this means information can be measured as a physical entity
and can be manipulated and transmitted between two distant points.
This study is an interdisciplinary field which has seen the intersection of
Mathematics, Statistics, Physics, Computer Science and Neuroscience . It
can be divided into two major classes:
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• Quantum Computing: the field of study which applies the laws of quan-
tum mechanics for quantum information processing. It deals with how
one can build a quantum computer and algorithms which can exploit
its power [3].
• Quantum Communication: the field of study which is based on trans-
ferring quantum information (e.g. quantum states) from one place to
the other [3].
Cryptography is a technique of securing communication in the presence of
an adversary [4]. This technique consists of transforming a message (plain
text) into an incomprehensible form called a cipher text such that if it was
intercepted by an adversary, it reveals little, if not, no information about the
actual message.
The first time the use of cryptography was introduced, it was only related to
ensure the message was not disclosed to the unintended person by transform-
ing messages from a coherent shape into an incoherent one and vice versa
[4]. Typical example of these classical ciphers would be:
• transposition ciphers: are encoding methods which change the arrange-
ment of letters in a message into a cipher text depending on an appro-
priate regular system (e.g.; ’hello world’ becomes ’ehlol owrdl’) [4].
• substitution ciphers: another type of encoding method which consists
of shifting the position of letters upside down with other letters in a
message according the order of the alphabet. Caesar cipher is a typical
illustration of a substitution cipher [4].
During the modern era with the birth of computers, the objectives of cryp-
tography go beyond privacy techniques with respect to a message to include
other techniques. For example:
2
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• checking if the message reached the receiver untouched,
• ensuring the identity of the sender and receiver,
• verifying the message content by encoding it with the sender signature,
• checking if the communication done between the sender and the receiver
is authentic, and many more [5].
Modern classical cryptography is organised into two major parts: Symmetric
key algorithms and Asymmetric key algorithms .
A Symmetric key algorithm involves a technique where both users (usually
referred to as Alice and Bob) utilize an identical private key for encryption
and decryption. This algorithm is used as either a block cipher or a stream
cipher. A block cipher takes a block of a message and transforms it into a
cipher text instead of transforming bit by bit at a time. A typical example of
a block cipher is Data Encryption Standard (DES) or Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), first introduced by the US government [5].
On the contrary, a stream cipher constructs a random long sequence key,
which is added to the plain text, one by one or letter by letter, such that the
output stream is built according to the secret internal condition that evolves
as the cipher performs. The secret internal condition is initially set up using
a private key. An example of a stream cipher is the One-Time Pad (OTP)
scheme introduced by Gilbert Vernam [5].
An Asymmetric key algorithm is another type of cryptographic algorithm
where users have two different keys: a key for encrypting the message and
available to the sender and the receiver and a private key used for decryption
kept secret by both users [5]. Asymmetric ciphers are designed by robust
computations. RSA was the first public-key cipher established by Ronald
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman in 1978 [5].
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All these cryptographic techniques rely on either the computational security
or the information theoretic security (unconditional security) [6].
The computational security describes a system which is easily deconstructed
in theory by using any possible key but it requires more effort and time for
an attacker to implement it [6].
The information theoretic security indicates a system where the adversary
has massive technological resources but the system is still unbreakable. This
is much more suitable than computational security but it is complicated to
reach practically [6].
According to Claude E. Shannon [2], one can implement a system with un-
conditional security if the secret key is the same size as the plain text. Infor-
mation Theory can be used in different ways in cryptography: to check if the
system used is unconditionally secure, to establish the range of existence of
the unconditional security of system, or to minimize the task decomposition
of a system which is the same as a decomposition of one of its primitives (e.g.
a one-way function)[2].
There exists a particular case of symmetric key ciphers that Shannon used
to prove that unconditional security is possible: the One-Time Pad (OTP)
encryption [7]. The use of OTP requires some basic conditions to be fulfilled:
• the secret key must be arbitrary, non repetitive,
• the secret key and the plain text(message) have the same length,
• and the secret key is used only one time and then discarded never to
be used again.
When the above conditions are fulfilled, then an easy operation of encoding
(like a logical XOR) will produce an unbreakable cipher text. Although an
4
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adversary might have massive technological resources, they will not obtain
any information from the seized message [7].
Both Symmetric key algorithms and the Asymmetric key algorithms are
presently used worldwide for example in Internet banking and some are in-
stalled directly in physical devices such as smart cards. However, the security
of these techniques can be compromised because it is only based on the com-
putational complexity of mathematical functions [3]. With the quick growth
of information technology, one will be able to build a quantum computer
which can factorize large numbers then these techniques will no longer be
reliable [8]. In addition, classical cryptographic techniques don’t offer the
possibility of Alice and Bob detecting if the communication is being tam-
pered with, by the eavesdropper usually referred to as Eve.
In order to overcome these problems, Quantum Cryptography also known as
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) was introduced as a process of exchanging
a symmetric key instead of the encoded message itself [9]. QKD is a process
of encoding information in a quantum carrier, such as single photon and
distribute that information between Alice and Bob , despite of the adversary’s
presence (Eve) [10]. The implementation of QKD is protected by laws of
quantum mechanics such as:
• Heisenberg uncertainty principle: ensures that if Eve intercepts infor-
mation coming from Alice, and tries to measure it, that action of mea-
suring will introduce changes in the quantum states “disintegration of
the wave function”[11] prior to reaching the intended receiver [12].
The errors in the quantum transmission are observed in the changes




• No-cloning property: removes any possibility for Eve to make copy of
quantum states [13, 14].
Quantum transmissions require an appropriate protocol using two channels
(link), namely a quantum link and an authenticated classical link. The quan-
tum link is applied for the quantum transmission by exchanging encoded sin-
gle photons. A quantum link is any material connecting two users, (Alice and
Bob) enabling light to pass through it with few losses by isolating the quan-
tum state from any interaction with the environment. A quantum link used
for the implementation of QKD can be an optical fibre or free-space. The
authenticated classical link is used to compare measurements between Alice
and Bob by identifying and correcting errors obtained during the quantum
information. This process is called post-processing which results in a final
key. An example of an authenticated public channel is a computer network,
a telephone line or a radio.
1.1. Research Description
Implementations of a QKD system requires users to ensure the security and
the efficiency of system against the intervention of an adversary. One aspect
of a QKD system that demands additional and critical observation is the
error correction process. The quantum link suffers from losses resulting from
the optical fibre or even from free-space medium of the atmosphere, as well
as from eavesdropping attacks. These losses introduce noise in the quantum
transmission which turn out to be errors in the transmitted key. Therefore
an error correction protocol is crucial to a QKD system.
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In this research, we describe the steps followed to produce a final key. Our
main focus is on the post-processing process where an error reconciliation
protocol named “Cascade”is applied to correct errors obtained in the exper-
iment [15].
1.2. Research Objectives
The implementation of a QKD system experiences errors due to noisy de-
vices and potential interference of an eavesdropper. Both effects prevent the
achievement of the proper quantum transmission required by an ideal QKD
protocol, and lead to errors in the transmitted key.
Efficiently reconciling these errors is the primary focus of this research by
applying the Cascade error correction protocol [15]. This thesis will also
discuss other error correction protocols such as Low-Density Parity Check
(LDPC) [16, 17], and Winnow [18] in comparison to the Cascade error cor-
rection protocol [15] in terms of effectiveness and the privacy amplification
methods.
In order to achieve the aim of this work, the Cascade error correction protocol
is applied to a sifted key obtained from a QKD protocol constructed through
the experimental set-up. The Cascade correction protocol implemented in
this work aims to identify and reconcile errors in that sifted key.
1.3. Research Questions
This thesis attempts to find answers to the following questions regarding the
effectiveness of the Cascade error correction protocol:
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• What is the efficiency rate of the cascade correction protocol in terms
of correcting errors introduced in the shared key?
• What is the meaning of an error estimation, a quantum bit error rate
and the information leakage? What impact do all these elements have
in terms of the performance of the Cascade correction protocol?
• Is there any difference if an initial permutation was to be applied to the
sifted key during the error correction process which involves the use of
the Cascade protocol?
• Why was the Cascade correction protocol chosen for this work and not
any other error correction protocol?
This thesis is structured into six chapters:
• Chapter 1: provides an introduction of cryptography and the differ-
ence between classical cryptography and quantum cryptography.
• Chapter 2 : discusses quantum mechanical laws applied in the im-
plementation of a QKD system to protect the exchange of information
between users.
• Chapter 3: is a literature review of the key distribution process, and
different protocols which can be implemented to produce a secure key.
This chapter also discusses different types of schemes an attacker can
use to interfere in the communication transfer.
• Chapter 4: describes the post-processing procedure which is per-
formed over the classical channel and it consists of three parts. The
first part involves estimating the errors in the sifted key. The second
part involves the error correction process and the third part involves
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the privacy amplification process. In this chapter, different error cor-
rection protocols are defined and their application for a QKD system
is discussed.
• Chapter 5: provides a methodology used in this research to correct
errors obtained in the experiment. This chapter presents the results
obtained, the analysis of the cascade error correction protocol in terms
of its effectiveness, its advantages, and its limitations.
• Chapter 6: presents the conclusion of this research and recommenda-
tions for future research outcomes.
9
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Basic Properties of Quantum Mechanics
Classical mechanics is the field of study of physical laws defining the motion
of bodies resulting from the effect of a system of forces [19]. It was devel-
oped during the time of Isaac Newton, and has been applied ever since in
multiple disciplines of science such as Astronomy, Chemistry, Geology, and
Engineering.
Classical mechanics describes the motion of bodies at the macroscopic scale
and provides accurate results. But when one needs to describe bodies at
the microscopic scale, or speeds approaching the speed of light, classical
mechanics fails [19]. The description of the behaviour of light is one of the
downfalls of classical mechanics. For example:
• Interference and diffraction of light describe light as a wave.
• The photo-electric emission and scattering of light describe light as
composed of small particles which are called photons, and each pho-
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ton has a specific energy and momentum quantized depending on the
light frequency. Photons appear to have a real existence similar to an
electron or any other particle known in Physics [19].
Another failure of classical mechanics arises when one tries to define a model
of an atom with electrons moving around the nucleus in classical orbits.
Throughout such motion as any accelerated motion, electrons will lose their
energy which will cause them to spiral into the nucleus. According to classical
electrodynamics, the atom would not be stable but all this doesn’t comply
with the reality [20]. Therefore it was suitable to set up a new scheme which
could describe physical phenomena on the atomic level more than classical
mechanics; which is quantum mechanics [20].
Quantum mechanics provides a mathematical and conceptual structure for
the development of laws of a physical system at a microscopic scale. It
provides the foundation to quantum computation and quantum information.
Quantum mechanics takes place in the Hilbert space H also defined as the
state space. The Hilbert space itself is determined as a real or a complex
vector space which satisfies to the inner product rule of the system. Any
quantum mechanical system is defined by its state vector, which is a unit
vector in the system’s state space [20].
2.1. The Qubit
A simple illustration of a quantum mechanical system is a qubit which has
a 2-dimensional state space. A state itself refers to a perfect representation
of a physical system. The bit represents the unit of a classical information,
which takes one of the two possible values, either 0 or 1. However, the unit
of quantum information is represented by a quantum bit or a qubit [20].
11
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Figure 2.1. Geometric representation of a qubit.The vector |ψ〉 makes an angle
with the z-axis.To determine if the state of |ψ〉, a measurement is made by using
its projection on z-axis.
The Bloch sphere describes the pure state space of a qubit in a simplest
form (see Figure 2.1). The wavefunction describing a qubit in a generic
superposition state might collapse in one of the two eigenstates, in analogy
to a classical bit that can have either one of the two possible values. However,
a qubit differs from a classical bit in its ability to exist in a superposition of
states. This implies that one can encode more information than a classical
bit.
According to Figure 2.1, the z-axis is used as a measuring basis. The vector
|ψ〉 makes an angle θ with the z-axis, and the Bloch sphere indicates that |ψ〉
is not fully in |0〉 or |1〉 state. But its projection on the z-axis will determine
in which state |ψ〉 is. This means that when the measurement is performed,
|ψ〉 will collapse in one of the two states.
12
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2.2. The Superposition Principle
Consider having a state |0〉 and a state |1〉, and these two states form an
orthogonal basis of a given state space. Therefore we can say that a state
vector of a qubit can be defined as a combination of state |0〉 and |1〉:
|ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 , (2.1)
where α and β are complex numbers. The normalization condition for state
vectors requires the states vectors to be orthonormal, demonstrated by the
relation 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 , therefore α and β are tied by this relation:
∣∣α2∣∣+ ∣∣β2∣∣ = 1 . (2.2)
According to the superposition principle, if a qubit has a basis of 2 states
then a full system of K qubits will have a basis of 2K states. It is the
same way for a music note having different harmonic frequencies or for light
composed by multiple colours [21].
2.3. Quantum Entanglement
Quantum entanglement is defined as the level of correlation between quan-
tum systems. Entanglement can occur between two quantum systems or
more. The interesting part is that these correlations occur between quan-
tum systems located in different places, which means any changes made on
one system are simultaneously correlated with changes to the other distant
system [22, 23].
Quantum entanglement is a remarkable aspect of quantum theory and has
many applications, such as: quantum cryptography to produce an uncondi-
13
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tional secure key, and quantum teleportation to transfer quantum informa-
tion from point to point [22, 23, 24]. Two entangled qubits can be described
by the following expression:
∣∣φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉s |H〉i + |V 〉s |V 〉i) , (2.3)
where |φ〉 is a Dirac notation called “a ket”and represents a column vec-
tor in Hilbert space [25]. |H〉 represents horizontal polarisation state, |V 〉
represents vertical polarisation state, s and i represent signal and idler pho-
tons respectively. These qubits are in a state called equal superposition,
there are equal probabilities to measure either |H〉s |H〉i or |V 〉s |V 〉i which
is
∣∣1/√2∣∣2 = 1/2. Suppose these two entangled qubits are distant, and one
each is given to Alice and Bob. If Alice measures her qubit, there are equal
probabilities of obtaining either |H〉 or |V 〉. Hence, Bob’s measurement must
be exactly the same as Alice’s because of the qubit’s entanglement.
2.4. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that it is impossible to deter-
mine with definite precision the position of a particle (x) and its momentum
(p) at the same time [26]. The more precisely one of these values is known,
the less precisely the other value is known [26]. Let us use an example of an
electron to explain this point. Consider an electron with a wavelength λ and
a momentum p that satisfies the de Broglie relation λ = h/p. Then consider
that electron oscillating as a sine wave and expand to infinity. Since the
wavefunction of this electron Ψ has a known wavelength λ, the momentum
of the electron is known [12]. But the wavefunction expands to infinity, which
means the precise position of the electron is unknown even if the probability
of finding the electron at a certain time and position is |Ψ|2.
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Figure 2.2. Graph of probabilities |Ψ|2 in terms of position of an electron. This
graph indicates that the electron has a high probability of being in the yellow
coloured region, or it has medium probability of being in orange coloured region
and a low probability of being in the green coloured region [27].
Heisenberg defined the product of the uncertainty in measurement of position
4x, and the uncertainty in measurement of momentum 4p to be approxi-
mately greater than Planck constant h. Therefore we have the mathematical
relation:
4x 4p > ~
2
, (2.4)
where 4x and 4p are not the range of the value of x and p, but rather
the range within one standard deviation of those values and ~ = h
2π
. This
principle is used in the implementation of a QKD system in such a way that
for an adversary to obtain information from the key distribution process,
they intercept photons coming from the sender, corrupt the state of those
photons by performing the measurement, and resend the photons to the
receiver. This action of measuring introduces changes in the state of photons
which will leave a trace in quantum transmission. Therefore, the adversary’s
activity is noticed by Alice and Bob.
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2.5. The No-Cloning Theorem
Another pillar of QKD is the no-cloning theorem which is used to prevent the
adversary from making a copy of a quantum state while keeping the original
state unchanged [28].
Consider an instrument which can transform the state |H〉 into |HH〉 and
the state |V 〉 into |V V 〉 where these symbols stand for arbitrary states. Let
us consider what will happen if we introduce into that instrument a linear
combination :
|L〉 = α |H〉+ β |V 〉 . (2.5)
Since quantum mechanics respects linearity properties, the output for their
superposition have to be the superposition of the output:
|M〉 = α |HH〉+ β |V V 〉 . (2.6)
We expected to get the original and the copy:
|L〉 |L〉 = (α |H〉+ β |V 〉)(α |H〉+ β |V 〉) . (2.7)
But this is not the outcome we get with the state |M〉. In conclusion one
cannot make a perfect copy of an unknown state without having any knowl-
edge of it in advance [25, 28]. An important aspect of this theorem is that
any adversary who tries to make a copy of a quantum state, performs a
measurement which introduces an error in the quantum transmission.
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Quantum Key Distribution Process
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a procedure of concealing information in
a quantum carrier such as a single photon and distributing that information
amongst legitimate users [29]. The goal of QKD is only to securely generate
and exchange the key amongst legitimate users. Thereafter, this key is used
with any encryption algorithm to conceal information distributed over the
classical link. This process is secure because it does not compromise the mes-
sage content and it also provides Alice and Bob the possibilities of detecting
Eve’s presence.
QKD is comprised of two parts. The first part is performed through the
quantum link. It consists of the exchange of quantum information between
Alice and Bob and also performing measurements implemented by Bob. The
second part is performed through the classical link and it consists of three
steps as shown in Figure 3.1. The first step is error estimation which allows
users to calculate the percentage of errors introduced during the quantum
transmission.
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Figure 3.1. The Quantum Key Distribution Process is performed between Alice
and Bob. Eve is an adversary who is trying to interfere in the communication
between Alice and Bob. QKD consists of two parts where the first part starts with
sharing quantum states between Alice and Bob thereafter they perform measure-
ments which yields to a raw key. The second parts Alice and Bob analyse the raw
key by performing the sifting process, error correction and privacy amplification
which yield to a secret key [30].
The second step is error correction which enables Alice and Bob to reconcile
errors in the transmitted key. The last step is privacy amplification and
it is performed in order to minimise the information an adversary could
have obtained during the quantum distribution process and error correction
process [29].
The concepts of QKD were introduced in 1970’s by Stephen Wiesner, in
his seminal paper entitled “Conjugate coding”[31]. According to Wiesner,
it is possible to store or to send two encoded messages using “conjugate
variables”such as linear and circular polarised light in such a way that only
one could reach the intended receiver and be transformed into the original
message [10, 31]. In other words, if the linear polarisation is observed or
measured, all chances of measuring the circular polarisation is lost. It was
later that Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard introduced the first QKD
protocol named BB84, (respective to their surnames Bennett, Brassard and
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the year of publication 1984) which uses Wiesner’s idea of superposition of
states [10].
QKD can be implemented with any particle such as ions, electrons, atoms,
and spin. However, photons travelling at the speed of light have proven to
be suitable for the task. Therefore, the quantum states of light can be sent
over long distances [22].
3.1. Quantum Key Distribution Channels
The meaning of communication may be regarded as a transfer of information
between two distant points. Therefore, whenever information is exchanged
over any distance, a communication conveyor is always needed [32]. For the
operation of a QKD system, a quantum link such as an optical fibre or free-
space is required as well as a classical link such as a radio or a computer
network.
The use of a quantum link for the operation of a QKD system serves in the
transmission of quantum information (e.g. states) while the use of a classical
link serves for the distribution of classical information. That is where users
find the percentage of error introduced in the quantum transmission, and
how to correct those errors and to minimise the information Eve could have
obtained.
3.1.1. Optical Fibre Links
An optical fibre is a narrow, long glass cylinder with specific properties to
carry light from one end of the fibre to another [32]. An optical fibre is made
of the core, the cladding and the buffer.
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Figure 3.2. Implementation of COW protocol using an optical fibre of 307 km
long as a quantum link [33].
The core is made of glass and has a higher index of refraction than the
cladding. The cladding on the other hand is made of plastic material and
has a lower index of refraction than the core. The boundary between the
core and the cladding acts as a mirror to keep the light contained even when
the fibre bends around corners. The buffer is used for the protection of the
fibre [32].
The implementation of a QKD system might require the use of optical fibres
as quantum links to transfer single photons from Alice to Bob. A typical
example is shown by Figure 3.2 where a secret key was obtained by im-
plementing the Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol using optical fibre as a
quantum link for a distance of 307 km [9, 34, 35].
Long distance communication using optical fibres as channels suffer from the
effects of signal loss and decoherence. In classical communication, amplifiers
are used to fortify the signal during long distance transmission, however in
quantum communication amplifiers cannot be used because they go against
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the no-cloning theorem [13, 14]. The use of optical fibres as quantum link
has some limitations. For example, losses of light energy, absorption, depo-
larisation errors and many more are observed as the size of the link increases
[36]. The state of the photon or the photon itself cannot be conserved if the
link is longer, hence the bit rate is reduced [36].
3.1.2. Free-Space Links
Although free-space links work the same as optical fibre links, the former
depends on line of sight between users instead of connection by an optical
fibre [22, 37, 38]. Free-space links typically support higher transmission rates
than optical fibre links and do not face the polarisation scrambling caused
by optical fibre [29].
Free-space links use telescopes or even space links such as astronomical tele-
scopes for global scale. For polarisation encoding specific, losses are insignif-
icant in the atmosphere therefore, the implementation of a QKD system
using free-space channels offer a more promising approach [38, 39]. Figure
3.3 shows how an entangled pair of photons was created and distributed over
a 144 km free-space channel [24].
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Figure 3.3. The implementation of quantum key distribution where entangled
photons were exchanged between two islands using a free-space link of 114 km
long. The picture was taken from a satellite [24].
Entangled photons and entanglement swapping offer a suitable solution to
overcome losses or errors encountered at long distance in optical communi-
cation. Therefore, instead of exchanging an entangled photons throughout
the entire distance, quantum repeaters are used to allow the quantum tele-
portation of a pair of entangled photons at long distant nodes [36]. The long
quantum link might be tens or hundreds of kilometres and it is divided in
shorter segments connected to each other. At each segment, entangled pair
of photons is created.
For example, between the system |A〉 and |Ra〉 the entangled state is con-
structed, and between |Rb〉 and |B〉 another entangled state is constructed
[40]. These initial entangled states can be easily obtained by using para-
metric down conversion process . To construct entangled state between |A〉
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and |B〉 a Bell measurement is performed on |Ra〉 and |Rb〉 and the quantum
state of |Ra〉 is teleported onto |B〉 even if particle |A〉 does not interact with
particle |B〉, they become entangled [41]. This is called entanglement swap-
ping and it is a simple procedure such that |A〉 and |B〉 are now entangled
at long distances. Therefore, a network of such as repeaters can be used to
establish entanglement over long distances [40].
3.1.3. Classical Links
As we have mentioned before, the implementation of QKD requires users to
be linked by the quantum link and the classical link. A classical link (usually
called a public channel) is a communication link used to exchange classical
information between users. Although this classical link is not completely
secure, the operation of QKD requires the classical link to be authentic.
This means that Eve is aware of the exchange of information between Alice
and Bob but there is no interference on her part. Otherwise Eve might
impersonate Bob in order to tamper with the information. An example of a
classical link can be a telephone line, a computer network or a radio.
3.2. Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
There exist many different protocols which can provide a secure key. The
implementation of these protocols applies the Heisenberg uncertainty prin-
ciple [12] and the No-cloning theorem to protect the quantum transmission
from the interference of an eavesdropper [23].
In 1984, the first QKD protocol was implemented and given a name of BB84
according to the surnames of the authors and the year when it was intro-
duced [29, 35]. This protocol is still one of the most famous and widely
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used protocols. The qubit based protocols require their implementation to
be based on the exchange of one single photon or qubit from Alice to Bob.
Other protocols introduced after the BB84 protocol such as B92 [42], E91
[43], SARG04 [44, 45] and COW [46], which will be discussed below, are
the modification of BB84 for the purpose of improving the security of QKD
[29, 35].
The principle of these protocols is based on the transmission of a random
chain of bits from Alice to Bob by encoding the bits into photon polarisation
states. Let us note here that bits are sent one by one [10, 29]. The implemen-
tation of these protocols also guarantees the detection of any eavesdropping
interference. Any interference of Eve is revealed by the errors noticed in the
key string received by Bob.
3.2.1. BB84 Protocol
The BB84 protocol is implemented by using two bases: a rectilinear basis
(+) and a diagonal basis (×) which correspond to four photon polarisation
states [10, 29, 35]. Alice generates a random chain of bits with value 0 or 1.
Prior to the quantum transmission, each photon polarisation state is assigned
a corresponding bit value according to the basis used [10, 29, 35]. Figure 3.4
illustrates how this process is performed.
Alice transmits bits to Bob one by one through the quantum link and every
time she does that, she records the time, the state and the basis of each
photon sent [10, 29, 35]. Figure 3.4 describes how the vertical and horizontal
polarisation states encode the quantum bit of value 0 and 1 respectively and
the −450 and +450 polarisation states encode 0 and 1 respectively.
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Figure 3.4. The BB84 protocol for Raw Key Exchange. According to this figure,
if Alice sends a bit of value 0 in the rectilinear basis, it is encoded in vertical
polarisation state and if she sends a bit of value 1 in the diagonal basis,it is encoded
as +450 state, so on and so forth [47].
Bob on the other end doesn’t know the encoding of each incoming photon. All
he does is selecting a random basis in which the measurement is performed,
either rectilinear or diagonal. During this process Bob records the time, the
basis and the result of each incoming photon he received [10, 29, 35].
After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob perform what is called sift-
ing. It is the step where they compare their results and leave out the bits
where they both have applied different bases. The shared key becomes the
remaining bits where Alice and Bob used the compatible bases.
According to Table 3.1, the implementation of the BB84 protocol gives Alice
and Bob 50% probability of measuring the photon using compatible bases
and 50% probability of measuring the photon using incompatible bases.
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Table 3.1. Illustration of the key sifting stage for the BB84 protocol
Bits of Alice 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
Bases used by Alice + + × + × × × +
Polarisation of Alice ↑ → ↘ ↑ ↘ ↗ ↗ →
Bases used by Bob + × × × + × + +
Public discussion
Shared key 0 1 0 1
Alice and Bob now randomly select a sample of bits in the shared key and
reveal their values in order to calculate the percentage of errors obtained in
the quantum transmission. If there is no error, the shared key has to be
similar for Alice and Bob which means there is no interference from Eve.
Then the shared key becomes the secret key [10, 29, 35]. In the presence of
the errors, Alice and Bob perform the post-processing procedure which will
be discussed in the next chapter.
3.2.2. B92 Protocol
The B92 protocol is a modification of the BB84 protocol. It uses two photon
polarisation states, but they are non-orthogonal quantum states [42]. The
author of this protocol concluded that only two quantum polarisation states
were needed, unlike the four states used in the BB84 [42].
Figure 3.5 illustrates how the B92 protocol was implemented using free space
as a quantum link [48]. The quantum transmission process of the B92 proto-
col goes as follows: Alice randomly selects one of her bases with a bit value
corresponding to that basis. Alice also selects one of her photon polarisation
states for the encoding of the bit, according to the basis chosen and the bit
value. Thereafter, she transfers the encoded bit to Bob.
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Figure 3.5. The description of the B92 protocol. This figure describes how the
B92 protocol was implemented using free space as quantum link of 17 m long [48].
Bob on his side has two techniques of identifying the incoming photons,
either he will get a “detection”on the photon detector of H - basis or “no
detection”on the other photon detector 450 - basis [42, 48].
Bob has a probability of detecting a photon equal to 1/2 when his polariser
is not orthogonal with one of Alice’s. These instances are explicit as they
occur when the polarisation settings of Alice and Bob were not orthogonal
hence, their bit values were both 1 or 0 [42].
There exist other instances when Bob detects no photons. These instances
are called ambiguous. They occur when Bob’s polariser was orthogonal to
Alice’s or not but still Bob failed to detect a photon with 1/2 probability
[42] as illustrated in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. Illustration of Key Sifting Stage for B92 Protocol
Alice’s bit string 1 0 1 0
Alice’s polarisation 450 00 450 00
Bob’s polarisation −450 −450 900 900
Bob’s bit string 0 0 1 1
Bob’s bit detection No No Yes No
During the key sifting stage, Bob uses the public channel to reveal the time
when he obtained a detection, but not the exact result. Therefore 25% of
the bits are successful and 75% are unsuccessful and discarded [42]. The
second column of Table 3.2 shows that Bob failed to detect a photon while
his polarisation settings are not orthogonal with Alice’s.
3.2.3. SARG04 Protocol
The SARG04 protocol was introduced after noticing some weaknesses of the
BB84 protocol when exposed to the photon number splitting attacks (PNS)
which are performed by Eve over the quantum link [44]. The different attacks
that Eve might perform to tamper with the communication of Alice and Bob
are discussed later on in this chapter [49]. The SARG04 protocol functions as
the BB84 protocol but has proven to be strong to oppose the PNS attacks.
It uses four non-orthogonal quantum states for key transmission. There
is another version of the SARG04 protocol which applies an entanglement
approach [45].
The functioning of SARG04 is the same as BB84 on the quantum scale: Alice
uses one of her four photon polarisation states to encode the bits and send
them to Bob [44]. Then Bob arbitrarily chooses one of his two particular
filters αy and αx to detect the incoming photons. But the radical changes
are observed at the encoding and decoding stage [44].
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During the encoding stage, Alice uses two states to encode one bit. In other
words, bits are encoded in the bases since two states constitute one basis.
For example, both states |+y〉 and |−y〉 conceal the bit 0 and both states
|+x〉 and |−x〉 conceal the bit 1 [45].
Given the four sifting sets are the four non-orthogonal photon polarisation
states used to send the bits in:
A++ = {|+y〉 , |+x〉},
A−− = {|−y〉 , |−x〉},
A+− = {|+y〉 , |−x〉},
A−+ = {|−y〉 , |+x〉},
where

|+y〉 = |0〉 ;











If Alice sends |+y〉, then she announces |+x〉, so in this case for Bob to guess
correctly he has to measure αx and find |−x〉. However, if he measures αy
and finds |−y〉, then he would have guessed incorrectly [45]. In the absence
of errors, the size of the key resulting from the sifting stage is 1
4
of the raw
key, but in the presence of the errors this size is greater [45]. Errors in the
quantum transmission can be caused by:
• depletion of photons in the quantum link,
• the transformation of the state by Eve,
• or dark counts at the receiver’s station.
The SARG04 protocol offers almost the same security as the BB84 protocol
in terms of single photon transmission. The performance of SARG04 pro-
tocol becomes less than the one of the BB84 protocol in presence of losses.
However, in the presence of PNS attacks, the SARG04 protocol has proven
to offer better security than the BB84 protocol [44].
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3.2.4. E91 Protocol
In 1991 Artur K. Ekert introduced a protocol which uses entangled states.
Later on, this protocol was named E91 referring to its founder surname and
the year in which it was introduced [43]. The entangled pair of photons used
to implement this protocol, can be created either by Alice, or by Bob. The
pair of entangled photons can also be created by a source distant from both
of them, including Eve. The quantum transmission is done in such way that
each user has one photon from each pair [43]. The objective of this protocol
is to detect the activity of an eavesdropper by using Bell’s inequalities [43].





(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉 . (3.1)
The entangled pair of photons is created by the spontaneous parametric
down conversion process observed when the light passes through a non-linear
crystal such as a BBO crystal which is able to split the UV light into two
entangled photons one called the signal and the other one called the idler
with a wavelength twice that of the source as shown in Figure 3.6.
In the case of using the BBO crystal type II as illustrated in Figure 3.7, if
Alice and Bob use consistent bases and Alice measures a particle with spin
up, Bob measures a particle with spin down with 100% probability. The same
if Alice measures a particle with spin down, Bob detects a particle with spin
up with 100% probability [43]. Things will be different if Alice and Bob apply
inconsistent bases to detect their particles. For example, if Alice measures a
particle with spin up in the 450 basis, there exits an equal probability of Bob
to measure a particle with spin up or down in the 900 basis [43].
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Figure 3.6. Creation of entangled photons. The light at the source has a wave-
length of 405 nm, after passing through the BBO crystal, two entangled photons
are created with a wavelength of 810 nm each [27].
The implementation of QKD using the process of quantum entanglement
takes place as follows: neither Alice nor Bob control the source or the en-
coding. If Alice receives a photon and performs a measurement on it, this
instantaneously influences Bob’s outcome [43].
Figure 3.7 indicates how entangled photons A and B are created when the
light hits the BBO crystal. Bob will measure a photon B with vertical or
horizontal polarisation state. Some part of the light which goes through the
BBO crystal is reflected back and creates photons C and D again at the
BBO crystal. The photon D goes to the detector and indicates the photon
to be teleported exists. Alice will check the coincidence counts on her two
detectors.
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Figure 3.7. Illustration of the E91 protocol using quantum entanglement scheme.
Two entangled photons A and B are produced after the light passes through the
BBO crystal. Photon B goes to the detectors at Bob’s side be be measured.
Photons A goes to Alice to allow her to measure coincidence counts. There is a
portion of the light which is reflected back to the BBO crystal after Photon A and
B are produced. This light will produce two entangled photons C and D. Photon
C goes to Alice to be enable her to observe coincidence counts. D is measured
locally to ensure the process was perfect [27].
Continuum based protocols
These protocols use coherent states for the quantum transmission process.
The quantum states are obtained when the intensity of the laser output
gives a single pulse. Normally the quantity of photons in one single pulse is
random but the implementation of these protocols requires for the quantity
of photons in one single pulse to be an average number [35].
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3.2.5. Coherent One-Way Protocol
The Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol is a recent protocol for quantum
key distribution introduced by Nicolas Gisin et al in 2004 [46].
The implementation of the COW Protocol is performed by encoding logical
bits in time. The protocol is constructed with a small number of standard
telecom tools [46, 50, 51].
Alice sends a continuous sequence of pulses where this sequence can be di-
vided into two sets and in each set the logical bit of information can be at
the start, µ−0 for a logical “1”or the logical bit of information can be at the
end 0−µ for a logical “0”[50, 51]. The implementation of the COW protocol
is shown in Figure 3.8.
For the detection of eavesdropping activity Alice sends decoy sequences µ−µ.
Bob uses the data line to get the raw key by measuring the time each photon
reaches the detector DB. The security of the protocol is checked when Bob
arbitrarily determines if there is any constructive or destructive interference
with the interferometer and detectors DM1 and DM2.
Bob always gets constructive interference in DM1 whenever the direction
of the beam from the laser and the phase of the interferometer are well
positioned. But if Bob detects destructive interference in DM2 this means
there is a loss of coherence therefore, the presence of an eavesdropper is
revealed. In this kind of situation, users have to reject the key in order for
the information to be kept hidden [46].
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Figure 3.8. Scheme of the COW protocol. The raw key is obtained from the data
line by measuring the time arrival of photons on DB. To check for the interference
of Eve, Bob uses the monitoring line by detecting the pulse coherence with the
interferometer and the detectors DM . The symbol IM stands for the intensity
modulator, Att. stands for the attenuator and BS is the beam splitter [46]
.
The sifting process is done by Bob identifying detections he received in the
detector DB in time slot i and i+2 and assigning them the bit value 0.
The bits Bob received in the detector DM in time slot i and i-2, he assigns
the bit value 1. Thereafter, Bob reveals the results he obtained and if the
results agree with what Alice sent, they keep the bits, otherwise they discard
the incompatible bits. Therefore, the bits used for decoy sequences are also
discarded. The COW protocol has been proven to resist PNS attacks and
even the intercept-resend attack introduced by an eavesdropper [46, 50, 51].
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3.3. Eavesdropping Attacks
As mentioned earlier, imperfection in the equipment used in the implementa-
tion of a QKD system introduce errors in the quantum transmission. Errors
are also introduced by the activity of an eavesdropper. In the following para-
graphs, we examine some of the strategies used by an adversary to obtain
information from the quantum transmission.
3.3.1. Intercept-Resend Attack
An intercept-resend attack is a simple strategy used by Eve by capturing
each incoming photon from Alice’s station and measuring it using one of her
bases. Afterwards, Eve sends a new photon to Bob depending on the result
obtained in measuring the photon coming from Alice as illustrated in Figure
3.9.
This attack is classified as one of individual attacks performed by Eve, occur-
ring when single photon transmission is involved [35]. If Eve uses the same
basis as Alice there will be no error in Bob’s measurement and her presence
will not be detected.
But each time Alice sends a qubit to Bob, she randomly chooses the basis.
Which means there is a high possibility of Eve using the wrong basis for
measuring the incoming photon, hence Bob will have errors in his string bit
even if he uses a compatible basis as Alice to measure photons he gets from
Eve [35].
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Figure 3.9. Illustration of the intercept-resend attack performed by Eve over the
quantum link [52].
Assuming the implemented protocol was BB84, the probability of Bob getting
the right result is 50% as for Eve, she get the right basis with 50% probability.
These outcomes will induce the error rate of 25% which is more than the
failure threshold for this protocol, hence the presence of Eve is noticed. To
overcome this problem, Alice and Bob reject the key and start again with
the quantum transmission process [35].
3.3.2. Photon Number Splitting Attacks (PNS)
Let us assume Alice and Bob are performing a single photon transmission
using the BB84 protocol. The laser used to produce photons is attenuated so
that it gives a single photon per pulse. Practically, the pulse sent from Alice
to Bob might contain more than one photon [49]. This attack is demonstrated
in the Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10. Illustration of the photon number splitting attack executed by Eve
over a quantum link [52].
In the cases of multi photon transmission, Eve performs what is called a
polarisation splitting operation or an active arrangement of beam splitters
alongside with quantum non-demolition (QND) measurements, then she de-
tains one photon and the remaining ones are sent to Bob. These techniques
performed by Eve will not modify the state of the photons reaching Bob,
instead they will enable Eve to have full knowledge of the quantum trans-
mission process without revealing her presence [49].
Therefore for each pulse sent containing more than one photon, Eve will gain
full information without introducing error in the sifted key. These types
of attacks get worse if users are operating with a high lossy quantum link,
because Eve might be able to substitute the quantum link with a perfect one.
Hence, she can control the signal Bob receives [49].
To overcome these kinds of situations, researchers proposed the SARG04
protocol to fight against PNS attacks. As mentioned earlier, this protocol
is implemented using attenuated laser pulse and four non-orthogonal states
unlike the BB84 protocol [44]. Another protocol built to overcome PNS
attacks is the COW protocol, it is executed in such a way that the encoding
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of bit is done in time. This protocol is constructed in a simple way allowing
Alice and Bob to have a secure quantum transmission as well as to detect
the presence of Eve [46].
3.3.3. Trojan-Horse attacks
The Trojan-Horse attack consists of Eve introducing a brighter light into
Alice’s settings. Eve will measure the back reflection of that light, enabling
her to get all the information about the polarisation or phase modulator
which are responsible for the encoding of the bits; if the BB84 protocol is
the one being implemented [35, 53].
To prevent this, it is recommended to put a monitoring line at Alice’s station
which controls incoming light and gives a notification to Alice every time Eve
introduces such a pulse. Alice and Bob can also insert an optical isolator into
their set-ups to prevent that incoming brighter light [35, 53].
3.3.4. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Although we mentioned that Eve cannot interfere with the conversation of
Alice and Bob over the public link as long as this channel is authentic, Alice
and Bob might fail to authenticate this channel. Therefore, Eve will be able
to impersonate both of them and obtain crucial information without Alice
and Bob realising it. This type of eavesdropping strategy is called the man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attack a illustrated in Figure 3.11. It consists of Eve
introducing malicious software through the classical channel and intercepting
information shared between Alice and Bob [54].
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Figure 3.11. The man-in-the-middle attack [55].
MITM attacks are caused by Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Cache
Poisoning, Domain Name System (DNS) Spoofing, Session Hijacking, and
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Hijacking. Assume Eve can create fake messages
and send them to Alice, for example, Eve can ask Alice her Internet Protocol
(IP) address by pretending to be Bob. Alice will reply to Eve thinking that
the message was sent by Bob. Eve will do the same to Bob, then all the
network traffic will be controlled by Eve and she will be able to get all the
information she needs [54].
MITM attacks is also observed when a client is trying to be connected to the
server while the attacker has created a fake web page which will give wrong
information. Every time a client opens a web page, a DNS request is sent
to the server of that web page. Therefore, the client to be connected to the
website, a reply has to come from that same server. If the attacker was able
to get the identification number related to DNS request and the reply, the
attacker will use ARP Cache Poisoning to direct the client to a fake web page
and the client will lose the important information [54].
39
Chapter 3. Quantum Key Distribution Process
This attack can be observed when a client opens a website and is required
to provide a user name and password for authentication and to establish
a network session. As long as the session is still open, the attacker might
intercept all private information of the client.
In conclusion, MITM attacks occur when users fail to strongly authenticate
the classical channel they are using for communication. MITM attacks might





The quantum transmission through optical fibre or in free-space suffers from
the interference of an eavesdropper introduces errors in the system. The
errors can also be caused by noise in the equipment. To overcome that, users
have to discuss over the classical channel which technique to apply for the
correction of those errors [56]. The post-processing procedure is composed
of three steps: the first step is called error estimation. It involves finding the
percentage of wrong bits in the sifted key. The second step is error correction
and it involves in removing the wrong bits in the sifted key. The third step
is called privacy amplification and its goal is to minimize information leaked
to a small arbitrary value. This work only focuses on the two first steps of
post-processing: error estimation and error correction.
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Figure 4.1. Illustration of the different steps which constitute the post-processing
operation.
4.1. Error Estimation
As mentioned before, the error estimation involves finding the percentage of
errors committed during the quantum transmission. Therefore, Alice and
Bob calculate the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER).
Quantum Bit Error Rate
The quantum bit error rate is given by the quotient of the erroneous bits
to the total number of bits in the sifted key and it is always expressed as
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where Wwrong represents the total of the wrong bits and Wright represents
the total of the right bits. Rerror stands for the total of erroneous bits and
Rsift stands for the total of bits after the sifting process. The equation 4.1 is
represented as a ratio, to express it as a percentage, it is multiplied by 100.
The calculation of the QBER goes as follows: Alice randomly select a sub-
string of the key and sends Bob the corresponding bits and their values.
Bob compares this sub-string to the corresponding one in his sifted key and
reveals the result [35]. This sub-string is used to calculate the QBER and its
bits are discarded.
There exists an alternative method Alice and Bob may use to calculate the
QBER. They calculate the QBER for each basis used. With this method,
the key rate is increased and the number of times where the incompatible
bases were used is decreased [57].
The bits disclosed by applying the second method are also discarded but
the errors introduced by Eve are easily detected [35]. The QBER is an
important feature for the implementation of a QKD system. It determines
the security and the efficiency of the system, and also reveals the existence
of an eavesdropper and how much information they have learnt from the key
as shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. The Detection of Eve’s presence. After comparing the bases used
and discarding bits with incompatible bases, the shared key still has some errors
in it. Taking the example of this figure, the photon number 8 shows that the same
basis was used but different results were obtained. This demonstrates that Eve
tampered with the transmission.
4.2. Error Correction Process
An error correction process is the step where users rectify errors in the sifted
key [58]. Note that the QBER is the parameter which determines if the error
reconciliation stage can be applied or not. There is a parameter called a
failure threshold for any QKD protocol. It is the percentage of errors any
QKD protocol shouldn’t exceed.
This percentage of errors is different for each QKD protocol. Therefore, the
QBER has to be less than the failure threshold, in order to execute the error
correction stage. Otherwise, if the QBER is more than the failure threshold
the transmission has to be aborted and started from scratch. If necessary
the quantum link is modified.
The most important goal of the error correction process is to allow users
to efficiently locate and fix errors in the sifted key while revealing as little
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information as possible over the public classical channel [59]. Actually, Eve
gains more information of the key over the classical channel however she
cannot interfere, the only thing she can do is listen to the communication of
Alice and Bob [59].
An efficient error correction protocol has to satisfy the following characteris-
tics:
• be capable of working with a high QBER (e.g. 1% - 5%),
• be capable of minimising the information leaked to Eve (the revealed
bits during the error correction process are discarded).
There exist many error correction protocols which can successfully correct
errors in the sifted key. Some have a recursive structure, which means they
require multiple iterations to correct all errors (e.g. Cascade, Winnow) [15,
18]. Others have a non-recursive structure, which means they require only
one iteration and all the errors are corrected (e.g. LDPC Codes, Turbo
Codes) [16, 17, 60]. At the end of the error correction process, users should
have the identical keys.
4.2.1. Cascade Protocol
The Cascade Protocol is a reshaped protocol from another protocol named
BBBSS introduced in 1991 by Bennett, Bessette, Brassard, Salvail, and
Smolin [59]. BBBSS is an interactive reconciliation protocol, allowing Al-
ice and Bob to locate and fix errors. The BBBSS protocol is composed of a
number of passes, random permutations applied on the sifted key.
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Table 4.1. An example of a parity bit
7 bits of a string
Counts of 1-bits in the string
8 bits including the parity bit
Even Parity Odd Parity
0000000 0 00000000 00000001
0001000 1 00010001 00010000
1101001 4 11010010 11010011
0110111 5 01101111 01101110
The goal of these permutations is to isolate the erroneous bits randomly so
that the even parities capable to mask each other will be revealed and also to
prevent burst errors in the sifted key [59]. For the Cascade error correction
protocol or for any other error correction protocol which uses parity checking
process an odd parity is 1 and the even parity is 0.
The error correction process of BBBSS starts by dividing the sifted key into
blocks of M1 according to the calculated QBER for a purpose of having one
error in each block. A parity bit for each block is calculated and exchanged
publicly. A bit added at the end of a string of bits so that the count of 1-bits
in that string is an even number or an odd number is called a parity bit.
This operation is demonstrated in Table 4.1.
However, during the BBBSS operation no bit is added to the sifted key, the
users only perform a parity checking . For blocks with same parities it means
there is no error in that block. But if the parities are different, there has to
be an odd error because even errors disguise each other. The parity checking
operation is demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. Description of the parity checking
Figure 4.4. The binary search operation. It is applied on the block of Alice and
on the block of Bob. The green bit is the flipped bit.
47
Chapter 4. Post-Processing
The block with a mismatching parity is split up into two sub-blocks with
size of M1
2
and the parity check is run again. This method is called “binary
search” and it is shown in Figure 4.4 [59].
By using the first block of Alice’s string of bits and the first block of Bob’s
string of bits shown in Figure 4.3, the binary search can be performed as
shown in Figure 4.4.
The permutation of the sifted key is applied and the binary search operation
is conducted again to identify masked errors. Since the parity check and the
binary search are performed over a the classical channel, the authors of this
protocol assumed that these processes offer the information about the key to
the attacker. They proposed to leave out the bit at the end of each block and
sub-block where the parity was shared, in order to reduce the information an
attacker could have gained during the error correction process. This is called
“Privacy maintenance” [59]. To decrease the amount of bits discarded during
the parity checks, the binary search protocol uses a method called confirm
and bisect, which loses fewer bits during the last passes. The BBBSS protocol
requires 20 parity check passes, for Alice and Bob to be confident they have
the same reconciled keys in the end.
Cascade was introduced in 1994 by Brassard and Salvail [15]. The Cascade
protocol is like the BBBSS protocol because they both perform a binary
search operation and parity checking process but their differences are remark-
able. Similarly to the BBBSS protocol, by applying the Cascade protocol for
the first pass the sifted key is divided into equal blocks M1, depending on
the calculated QBER, and the parity check of every block is shared as shown
in Figure 4.3 [15] .
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Figure 4.5. Illustration of the Cascade protocol. According to this figure, Alice
and Bob have divided their string bit in equal blocks. The first block on Bob’s
side is not the same as Alice’s. The binary search is run on this block by dividing
this block into small blocks until the single error is located and fixed. For the
next pass, this block with error is doubled in size and the binary search is run
again. If a new error is found, it means that, this error was masked in the previous
pass. Then the error is corrected and cascade goes back to the previous pass to
try locate the matching error.
Also similarly to the BBBSS protocol, a binary search is conducted to find
a single bit error for blocks which parities are different. The binary search
consists of dividing the blocks with mismatching parities into sub-blocks and
running the parity check on those sub-blocks again (see Figure 4.4). However,
no bit is discarded on this pass instead the errors are fixed then a permutation
is applied and the length of blocks with errors is increased to 2M1.
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The second pass is started the same as the first one. Any error located and
fixed in the second pass indicates there is at least one equivalent error in
the previous pass on the same block because neither error was revealed or
corrected in that pass [15].
Whenever a new error is found, it indicates the ability of having masked
other errors in the previous pass, hence the process is repeated to detect
and correct errors in all the previous passes. That’s where it gets the name
“Cascade”. The authors of this protocol recommended four passes be used
because in every pass after the first one, an average of two errors will be
corrected which means the number of errors are decreased exponentially.
The Cascade protocol has been investigated since the day it was introduced,
it suffers from a high amount of information exchanged which can be leaked
to the eavesdropper but it has been proven to be productive in correcting all
the errors if implemented appropriately.
4.2.2. Winnow
There exists another error correction protocol which offers low rate of in-
teraction and the same productivity as Cascade. This protocol is named
Winnow and it was introduced in 2003 by Buttler, Torgerson, Nickel, Don-
ahue, and Peterson [18]. It uses Hamming Codes to correct errors [60]. The
Winnow protocol consists of a parity check, a conditional Hamming hash,
and a privacy maintenance steps [61].
Hamming Codes are composed of two matrices, a generator matrix G and
a parity check matrix H connected as H · GT = 0. If G is a k × n matrix,
the code’s rate is r = k
n
where k and n represent the columns and rows




Figure 4.6. Description of the Hamming Codes. The sender calculates the dot
product of the message K and the generator matrix G which results in the code
word W and it is forwarded to the receiver. The receiver uses the code word W by
calculating its dot product with the parity check matrix which will result in what
is called a syndrome vector S. If the syndrome is equal to a zero vector then the
receiver is sure that the message reached its destination without being tampered
with. But the opposite result (i.e the syndrome is not equal to a zero vector)
indicates there is at least one error in the message and the receiver will attempt
to correct the message in order that the syndrome be equal to zero.
Hamming Codes have the capacity to detect two errors and correct one [18].
The Figure 4.6 shows how one can send a message using the Hamming codes.
But how do Alice and Bob use Hamming Codes as the Winnow error correc-
tion protocol in QKD? In order to answer this question there is an important
aspect that should be considered first. The Hamming Distance is the space
separating two valid code words. Therefore, the minimum distance dmin be-
comes the small space separating two valid code words. If the number of
errors in a code word is less than dmin then these errors will be located be-
cause they are not to change the code word into another valid code word.
But this code word might not be the correct one that is why there must be
some limits which one should consider.
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Figure 4.7. Error correction using Hamming Codes. There are errors in the
syndrome that Bob calculated in position 0 and in position 1. So Bob should
correct his key string in position 20 + 21 = 3. Transmitting the syndrome over the
public channel is the same as exchanging parity blocks in the Cascade Protocol,
and this exchange is what the authors of this protocol called Winnow.






code word will be decrypted and the closest to that bound will be the correct
code word. But if the amount of errors are greater than this bound, the code
word might seem like another code word but not the correct one [61].
In QKD, for Alice to transmit the key string in a secure way, she has to make
some changes so that the interaction with Bob will reveal less information
to Eve. First Alice calculates her syndrome by using the dot product of
the parity matrix and her key string (H · K) and sends it to Bob. On the
other hand, Bob also calculates his syndrome by using the dot product of the
parity matrix and his key string (H ·K ′) and compares the two syndromes
as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
If the two syndromes are equal S = S ′, it means the syndrome he received
from Alice was not tampered with and there is no error in it since it matches
the one he calculated on his own. But if they are not the same there must
be an error, then Bob will have to locate the error and correct it [61].
Similarly to the Cascade protocol Alice and Bob have to split the string of bits
into equal blocks with the size k, the authors suggested k = 8. Thereafter,
they have to compare their block parities to check if there is any difference.
Instead of performing the binary search like in the Cascade protocol, Alice





mod 2, and calculate
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the syndrome S of each block B with a mismatching parity where S =
H · B. After Alice sends all her syndromes to Bob, who calculates his own
syndromes and compares them to the ones received from Alice in the purpose
of correcting any single error [18].
To minimize the information leaked in the parity/syndrome exchange Alice
and Bob have to perform what we call privacy maintenance. The authors
of Winnow suggested discarding one bit for every parity/syndrome shared
publicly because those bits seem to be bit errors anyway but the selection
of the syndrome bits is not random. It is recommended to remove bits on
each block at position 2j where j ∈ {0, ...,m− 1} because these bits do not
depend on the syndrome calculation and they are the most visible.
After the first pass, Alice and Bob perform a permutation over their key
string and the procedure is repeated because this parity check used in this
protocol is only capable of locating an odd amount of errors and there are
still an even amount of errors in the key string. The block size has to be
increased and the parity check matrix recreated. The minimal passes needed
to correct all the errors or the block size for each pass have not be agreed on,
they are still a subject of discussion [18].
The disadvantage of Winnow is its dependency on the Hamming Codes which
can be the cause of errors if the error count in each block is too high. This
means the amount of errors detected has already grown bigger than the dmin
and the probability of the protocol to detect the valid code word from the
invalid one is also too high. To avoid the amount of even errors to be high,
the authors recommended to avoid the permutation for the first pass.
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4.2.3. Low-Density Parity Check Codes
The Low-Density Parity Check (LDPC) Codes are used as another error
correction protocol, first established by a researcher named Robert Gallager
in 1960 [16] however, LDPC Codes were not given so much consideration
in that time. Almost 40 years after, when the Turbo codes were becoming
popular [62], LDPC Codes were reintroduced by McKay in his paper named
“Good Error-Correcting Codes Based on Very Sparse Matrices”published in
1999 [17].
LDPC Codes are linear block codes operating like Hamming Codes. LDPC
are composed of a parity matrix H and a generator matrix G and also, like
Hamming Codes, the minimum distance plays a major role because it estab-
lishes the limits of the code [63].
An LDPC Code can be described in two different ways. It can be described
as a matrix with n × m dimension and with Wr representing the amount
of 1’s in each row and Wc representing the amount of 1’s in each column
as shown in Figure 4.8. To have an LDPC matrix two conditions must be
fulfilled: Wr  n and Wc  n [63].
An LDPC Code can also be described by graphic representations named Tan-
ner graphs [64]. Tanner graphs also called bipartite graphs, are composed by
two separate and distinct sets, check nodes(C-nodes) and variable nodes(V-
nodes) respectively. The construction of this graph consists of representing
the amount of parity bits as check nodes and representing the amount of
bits in a code word as variable nodes [63]. This type of description of LDPC
Codes is illustrated in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.8. Description of an LDPC Code as a matrix of dimension (8 ×4). Here
Wr = 2 and Wc = 4 [65].
Figure 4.9. Description of the Tanner graph. The amount of lines on each C-
node is constant and the amount of lines on each V-node are constant. This figure
represents a regular LDPC Code [65].
There exist two types of LDPC Codes: some can be regular codes or other
can be irregular codes. Gallager, when he first introduced them in 1960, he
described these codes as regular codes whenever the amount of 1’s in each
row or in each column is fixed and Wr = Wc × (n/m).
With a graphic representation, one can observe the uniformity of LDPC. The
number of lines coming from each C-node is the same, as well as the number
of lines coming from each V-node (see Figure 4.9).
LDPC Codes are irregular when the amount of 1’s in each column or in each
row is no longer consistent. This means for the Tanner graph, the number
of lines coming from each C-node is not consistent as well as the number
of lines coming from each V-node. Figure 4.10 describes an irregular LDPC
Code in Tanner representation [60].
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Figure 4.10. Irregular LDPC Code. The amount of lines on each C-node is no
longer constant, the same applies to each V-node [65].
Taking an example from Figure 4.9, a path coming from one node C: the
path from C0 → V1 → C1 → V5 → C2 → V7 → C0 or the path from
C0 → V3 → C3 → V4 → C0 are called a cycle. The girth is the shortest cycle
in the graphic representation of an LDPC code [60].
Encoding a message using LDPC Codes is the same as using Hamming Codes.
Alice calculates the code word using the dot product of the message and the
generator matrix and sends it to Bob. Next, Bob will multiply the parity
check matrix by the code word received from Alice to form a syndrome vector.
If the syndrome vector is zero then Bob assumes that the message reached
him unchanged. The LDPC Codes are different from Hamming Codes on
how Bob transforms the code word into the original message if the syndrome
is not a zero vector which means there are some errors in the code word [60].
4.3. Privacy Amplification
Privacy amplification is the final procedure of QKD performed after error
correction to minimise the information Eve has obtained while the quantum
transmission process was taking place as well as the error correction process
[66]. During error correction process Alice and Bob disclose some amount of
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information which can enable Eve to reconstruct the important part of secret
key as the error reconciliation process is performed on a public channel.
However, Eve can also gain information during the quantum transmission
process [67].
As mentioned earlier, the Winnow protocol discards some bits during the
error correction process but Cascade and LDPC do not. Therefore, these
bits are used to estimate the information leaked to Eve. At this stage, Alice
possesses an identical key to Bob but which Eve has some information about.
The privacy amplification stage is performed by using a universal hash func-
tion to reduce the knowledge Eve has gained about the key [68, 69].
The goal of privacy amplification is to construct a shorter random and secret
key even if Eve has a partial information about it, trying to compute this
hash function will introduce errors in her version of the key. A universal
hash function is randomly chosen from a class of hash functions, and is used
by taking an input data with the length of the reconciled key and reducing
it to a shorter length according to the amount of information leaked to the
adversary [69].
The privacy amplification process is used to achieve many goals such as, to
keep the integrity of the transmitted data by signing the document. The
privacy amplification process falls out of the scope of this study however, it
might be considered for future research outcomes.
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Implementation of Cascade Correction
Protocol
The implementation of Cascade protocol used in this work was performed
in the C++ programming language using Microsoft Visual Studio 2015 en-
vironment. The Cascade protocol is executed by a main class which calls on
two external classes. The first external class is a Random Number Generator
(RNG) which creates a common random seed according to Mersenne Twister
Algorithm [70] however, this class on its own cannot manage the permuta-
tion. Cascade uses another permutation class which maintains a sequence of
integers, randomly created, within the range of the key size. This is done
with the purpose of locating the block where the error is and even the error
itself in the string bit.
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Figure 5.1. Cascade operation. It is a chain of one function calling the other
starting from creating Alice object and Bob object. The function responsible
to find errors is given Alice object and Bob object. This function calls another
function responsible to build parity string, the latter function calls another function
responsible to get the parity. If Alice parity doesn’t match with Bob parity, a call
is made to the Get error function. The error is found and corrected. If the current
pass is not the first pass, cascade function is called to get the block containing the
error in previous pass; hence the parity of that block for Alice and Bob. If the
Alice parity matches with Bob parity the operation continue to the next pass but
if, Alice parity does match with Bob parity the program has to find the error on
that block; corrects it and after goes to the next pass.
The main class has seven functions. The first function has to create two
objects, one for Alice and another for Bob. The second function is to find
the errors in Bob’ sifted key. The third function is to build the parity. The
fourth function returns the parity built at the current pass. The fifth function
gives the block containing the error. The sixth function locates the error. The
seventh one does cascade after the first pass is finished. In other words, what
the last function does; is to look into other passes after the first one to locate
the error.
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Finding an error in any other pass after the first one means there is a matching
error in the previous passes but they were masked (see Figure 5.1).
To create an object for Alice, three arguments are used: the sifted key of
Alice, the common seed and the QBER. The value of the QBER determines
the size each block should have at the first pass. The object for Bob is created
using four arguments: the sifted key of Bob, the common seed, the QBER
and the address of the object of Alice.
The permutation for the first pass is omitted to prevent burst errors because
the goal of the permutation is to spread out the errors so that they will not
be masked during the parity checking. The Cascade operation only runs five
passes at once, to correct all the errors in Bob’s key. Every time the parity
is built the maximum and the minimum of bits leaked are tracked. The
actual bits leaked are also tracked to be used later in finding information
Eve could have gained during the error correction process. After the five
passes are completed, the corrected key (reconciled key) of Bob is plotted
and it is identical to Alice’s.
5.1. Key parameters for the effectiveness of the Cascade error
correction protocol
5.1.1. Shannon Entropy and Shannon Limit
According to Claude E. Shannon, every channel has a limited capacity to
transmit information [1]. The maximum capacity for a noisy channel to
successively transmit information at a certain rate with high probability is
given by
C = 1− H(X) , (5.1)
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Figure 5.2. The possible values of X for a binary symmetric channel. A proba-
bility of Alice sending a bit with value 0, but that bit gets flipped and Bob receives
1 is given by p. A probability of Alice sending a bit with value 1 and Bob receives
1 is given by 1− p.




pi log2 pi , (5.2)
where pi represents the probability of a given symbol. For a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) as shown in Figure 5.2, X can only take two possible values
with probability p and 1− p. Therefore the Shannon entropy H(X) of a BSC
is given by the following form:
H(X) = −p · log2 p− (1− p) · log2(1− p) . (5.3)
The capacity of a BSC then becomes:
C = 1 + p · log2 p+ (1− p) · log2(1− p) , (5.4)
where C is also called the Shannon limit (or Shannon Information) and if the
rate of transmission is greater than C, there is a failure in the transmission.
However if the rate of transmission is less than C, there is high probability
of the information to be transmitted effectively. By increasing the value of p
in a equation 5.4, the Shannon limit for a BSC is described by the following:
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Figure 5.3. The Shannon limit with respect to a change in p.
The value of p used to plot Figure 5.3 ranges form 0.01 to 0.1. Since this work
uses the Shannon limit to evaluate the performance of Cascade algorithm in
terms of correcting errors in the sifted key, it is fair to set similar initial
conditions for comparison by using the value of p in the same range as the
QBER. As the value of p increases, the Shannon limit decreases. The closer
a protocol is to the Shannon limit, the higher is its effectiveness to reduce
the information leaked. That is why in this work a comparison between the
Shannon limit and the Cascade error correction protocol is performed.
5.1.2. Efficiency and Information leakage of the Cascade error cor-
rection protocol
The evaluation of Cascade efficiency is done by performing a comparison
between the Shannon limit and the Cascade error correction protocol when
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the QBER increases. The increase of the QBER affects the information
leakage considered to be bits exposed during the Cascade error correction
process. The higher the QBER, the bigger is number of bits exposed. The
information rate of the protocol decreases.
The information rate is connected to the effectiveness of the Cascade error
correction protocol, in a such way that working with high QBER reduces the
efficiency of the Cascade error correction protocol. The information rate of
the protocol is given by:
IR = 1− BR
TB
, (5.5)
where IR is the information rate, BR is the amount of the redundancy bits
and TB is the amount of all bits. The quality of an error correction scheme





where m is the bits exposed, p is the QBER and nH(p) is the minimum
information needed for the error correction process. The efficiency parameter
f has a value > 1 and for f = 1 stands for the perfect reconciliation.
5.1.3. Advantages of the Cascade error correction protocol
The implementation of the Cascade error correction protocol is easily per-
formed and adjustable. This means it is able to work with different quantum
bit error rates which change the block sizes. The Cascade efficiency is closer
to the Shannon limit and the amount of information leakage is kept small.
The Cascade error correction protocol is a permanent interactive protocol
which means it requires multiple interactions between users until the error
correction process is completed.
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5.1.4. Limitation of Cascade Error Correction Protocol
The limitations of the Cascade error correction protocol are observed when
the QBER is wrongly estimated. As the QBER is responsible to set the size
of the blocks and the Cascade algorithm will fail to rectify all the errors in
the sifted key.
5.2. Results
The Cascade error correction protocol implemented in this work was run on
different sifted keys with different QBER. The first sifted key inserted into the
Cascade algorithm had 1 % of QBER with a length of 1000 bits. This sifted
key was used to compare the effectiveness of the Cascade error correction
protocol and the Shannon limit. The other remaining sifted keys with high
QBER were used to demonstrate how the information rate deceases when
the Cascade algorithm is performed on sifted keys with high QBER. They
were also used to demonstrate how the efficiency parameter increases each
time the amount of the bits exposed increases. The use of different sifted
keys with different QBERs has the objective of identifying the impact high
values of the QBER might have on an error correction protocol such as The
Cascade protocol in terms of performance.
5.2.1. Evaluation of Cascade Error Correction Protocol
The evaluation of effectiveness of the Cascade error correction protocol per-
formed in this work considers two parameters. The first parameter is the
comparison between the Cascade error correction protocol and the Shannon
limit. In order to achieve that, the Cascade algorithm was performed on the
sifted key with 1 % of QBER.
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After five passes were completed, the QBER was increased. The increase of
the QBER was performed in range of 0.010 - 0.100. Each time the QBER
was increased, the bits exposed were tracked to be used for the calculation
of the information rate using a equation 5.5. The results obtained are shown
in Table 5.1.
According Table 5.1 when the QBER was low (0.010) the Information rate
of the Cascade algorithm (0.864) was closer to the Shannon Limit (0.919)
because the difference between these two value is 0.055. However, when the
QBER became high (0.100), the information rate of the Cascade algorithm
(0.366) was no longer closer to the Shannon limit (0.531) since the difference
between the Shannon limit and Cascade algorithm is 0.165.
Using the results in Table 5.1, the graph showing how the effectiveness of the
Cascade error correction decreases when the QBER increases, was plotted as
shown in Figure 5.4.
According to Claude E. Shannon, a good error correction protocol should
be closer to the Shannon limit [1]. By referring to Figure 5.4, the Cascade
algorithm is closer to the Shannon limit when the value of the QBER is lower.
However, when the value of the QBER increases the Cascade algorithm moves
away from the Shannon limit.
65
Chapter 5. Implementation of Cascade Correction Protocol
Table 5.1. The comparison between the Shannon limit and Cascade algorithm
Key Length QBER Shannon Limit Information Rate
1000 0.010 0.919206864 0.864
1000 0.013 0.899917925 0.844
1000 0.015 0.88763929 0.836
1000 0.018 0.869941154 0.807
1000 0.020 0.858559457 0.795
1000 0.023 0.842031453 0.757
1000 0.025 0.831339069 0.749
1000 0.028 0.815739407 0.725
1000 0.030 0.805608142 0.719
1000 0.033 0.790779522 0.705
1000 0.035 0.781122273 0.697
1000 0.038 0.766954107 0.690
1000 0.040 0.757707811 0.686
1000 0.043 0.744118084 0.663
1000 0.045 0.735234966 0.659
1000 0.048 0.722160426 0.626
1000 0.050 0.713603043 0.618
1000 0.053 0.700993422 0.617
1000 0.056 0.69273164 0.557
1000 0.058 0.680546034 0.550
1000 0.060 0.672555081 0.549
1000 0.063 0.660759558 0.543
1000 0.065 0.653018712 0.530
1000 0.068 0.641584675 0.528
1000 0.070 0.634076349 0.521
1000 0.073 0.622979373 0.520
1000 0.075 0.615688456 0.514
1000 0.078 0.604907439 0.500
1000 0.080 0.59782081 0.492
1000 0.084 0.587337344 0.483
1000 0.085 0.580443504 0.471
1000 0.088 0.570241391 0.437
1000 0.090 0.563530183 0.435
1000 0.093 0.553595062 0.387
1000 0.095 0.547057452 0.379
1000 0.098 0.537376508 0.375
1000 0.100 0.531004406 0.366
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Figure 5.4. The performance of the Cascade Algorithm
The second parameter to consider is the information leakage. Applying the
Cascade algorithm to a sifted key with a high QBER affects the information
leakage. This is verified by the increase of bits exposed resulting in the de-
crease of the information rate. To demonstrate this statement, the remaining
sifted keys with a length of 1000 bits each were run into cascade one by one,
the bits exposed of each sifted key were registered and Table 5.2 indicates
the results obtained.
The results presented in Table 5.2 indicate how the increase of the QBER
causes the information rate to decrease. The values of information rate were
obtained using a equation 5.5. Therefore, by using equation 5.6 and the
values of information rate in Table 5.2, the efficiency parameter f was cal-
culated. The results obtained for the efficiency parameter f are illustrated
in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.2. Effectiveness of the Cascade Algorithm in presence of high information
leakage
Key Length QBER Bits exposed Information Rate
1000 0.036 315 0.685
1000 0.037 327 0.673
1000 0.041 347 0.653
1000 0.044 378 0.622
1000 0.046 392 0.608
1000 0.049 402 0.598
1000 0.050 421 0.579
1000 0.056 496 0.504
Table 5.3. Efficiency parameter of Cascade Algorithm
Key Length QBER Bits Exposed Efficiency parameter
1000 0.036 315 1.408
1000 0.037 327 1.431
1000 0.044 378 1.451
1000 0.046 392 1.456
1000 0.056 496 1.593
Table 5.3 shows that the efficiency parameter of the Cascade algorithm is
high when high values of QBER are used.
Cascade error correction protocol requires multiple iterations which consist
of parity checking of blocks and sub-blocks. Therefore, an amount of infor-
mation is exchanged between users over the classical channel. Although this
channel is authentic, it allows an attacker to know what is going on between
users. Therefore, during the error correction process, information can be
leaked to an eavesdropper which will allow them to correct their version of
the key obtained during the quantum transmission process.
With a high QBER, the size of the block to start with, for the error correction
process becomes small. This will require users to exchange many parity bits
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in order to correct their sifted key. Therefore, the high amount of bits will
be exposed during error correction process (see Table 5.2).
The application of the Cascade error correction protocol on a QKD system
of high values of QBER is not recommendable because the cascade protocol





Chapter 1 gives an introduction of how information can be measured and
exchanged amongst legitimate users in the presence of an adversary. It also
gives a definition of the cryptographic encryption and examines different
types of cryptographic encryptions one could use to protect the information
exchange. This chapter discusses the need of shifting from classical cryptog-
raphy to quantum cryptography.
Chapter 2 discusses how the classical mechanics deals with elements on the
macroscopic scale and how it fails to describe the behaviour of some elements
(e.g photons, electrons) on the microscopic scale. Therefore, quantum me-
chanics was introduced as an alternative field to deal with the behaviour of
some elements on the microscopic scale.
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In this chapter, the laws of quantum mechanics are defined and how they are
applied to guarantee security of the implementation of a QKD system.
Chapter 3 describes the background of QKD including different protocols
one can use to produce a secure key. This chapter defines different channels
which connect users in order to exchange the transmission. It also describes
different types of eavesdropping attacks which users can encounter.
Chapter 4 describes different steps followed when performing the post-processing
operation, and it presents the value of performing the post-processing oper-
ation. This chapter also describes various types of error correction protocols
and point out their differences.
Chapter 5 presents the implementation of the Cascade error correction proto-
col as one error reconciliation protocol applied in this work. This chapter also
presents the results obtained and how they were compared to the Shannon
limit to test the effectiveness of the Cascade.
Chapter 6 provides the summary of what is contained in each chapter. It
also provides the conclusion of the whole thesis demonstrating how the QBER
plays a major role in the implementation of a QKD system. This chapter
reminds the reader that the implementation of the Cascade error correction
protocol requires users to be working with low values of the QBER. This
chapter also provides recommendations on other fields of study.
The implementation of a QKD system requires an appropriate protocol, nev-
ertheless the quantum transmission can be intercepted by an eavesdropper
and this will introduce errors in the transmission. The errors also come from
the devices used. Therefore, an adequate error correction protocol is needed
for QKD. The Cascade error correction protocol is the most widely used.
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It was chosen in this work for that purpose, to evaluate its effectiveness in
the presence of different values of the QBER. We have mentioned that the
QBER is an important parameter for any QKD system because it determines
its security and efficiency.
• For the security: the value of the QBER reveals the presence of Eve
and Alice and Bob will decide if they have to abort the whole process
or to continue with the error correction process and later on the privacy
amplification process.
• For the efficiency: the value of the QBER indicates how efficient the
system is. It determines if the system is closer to the theoretic bound
(the Shannon limit) or not, it determines the information leaked dur-
ing the error correction process, and if the error correction process
performed is perfect or not.
The implementation of the Cascade correction protocol uses the value of the
QBER to divide the sifted key into blocks with equal size so that users would
start building the parity string. However, if the estimation of the QBER were
wrongly performed, the Cascade algorithm would fail to correct all the errors
in the sifted key.
In the presence of a high QBER, the block size decreases and causes an
increase in the parity string exchanged between Alice and Bob. Therefore,
the information which could be leaked (bits exposed) to Eve becomes high.
Working with high values of the QBER affects the Cascade error correction
protocol in terms of its effectiveness because the Cascade algorithm moves
away from the Shannon limit. The high values of the QBER also causes
the information rate of the Cascade algorithm to decrease. Therefore, the
efficient parameter of the Cascade algorithm is more than 1 which should not
be the case for a perfect reconciliation process.
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Therefore, for this reason it is recommended to apply the Cascade error
correction protocol to a sifted key with a low QBER as its efficiency is closer
to the Shannon limit and the information leaked is small. Cascade error
correction protocol demands many interactions between parities, it is feasibly
efficient and easy to implement.
6.2. Recommendation for future field of study
The purpose of the post-processing stage is to identify errors obtained during
the quantum transmission process and to correct those errors by applying an
adequate error correction protocol to the sifted key. Lastly, users have also
to remove the information an eavesdropper could have obtained through the
quantum link during the quantum process, as well as information leaked
during the error correction process.
The major focus of this work was to apply the Cascade error correction
protocol to a sifted key obtained through a QKD system constructed using
an experimental set-up. This operation was to identify and correct errors
obtained during the quantum transmission process. This work also tested
the Cascade error correction protocol in terms of effectiveness by comparing
the Shannon limit to Cascade in presence of a high QBER.
The next step would be to perform the privacy amplification process by
removing the information the attacker could have gained, with the purpose
of obtaining a secret (private) key. This private key is used to encode and
decode a message. In the future, it would be better to extend our research to
a free space QKD outside the laboratory where there is actual noise instead
of adding noise in the system. This means, the users will be working in
the presence of high QBER and the Cascade error correction protocol will
not be an appropriate protocol to use. According to our results, we noticed
73
Chapter 6. Conclusion
that Cascade error correction protocol moves away from the Shannon limit
as the QBER increases. Another point we noticed is that the efficiency
of the Cascade error correction protocol decreases as the QBER increases.
Therefore the error correction protocols such as LDPC codes or Tubo Codes
have been proven to be efficient to work with high values of QBER might be
the appropriate ones in such case.
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